Intentionale in Thomas Aquinas

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Introduction

“Intentionality” is all the rage these days. In its epistemological, as contrasted to its ethical, sense it was brought into modern currency by Brentano and picked up by Husserl and the phenomenological movement. Brentano’s concern was to distinguish psychical from physical states. He took the distinctive feature of mental phenomena to be the fact that they are about something. One does not simply know; one knows something. 1 Brentano attributed the term “intentional” to the Scholastics, and, indeed, one only has to open the index of a neo-scholastic treatise on knowledge to find multiple entries on intentional existence, intentional action, or intentional form. 2 In current usage, the term has broadened to include almost any description of mental acts. One hears of “naturalized” and even of “physicalized” theories of intentionality.

The purpose of this paper is neither to establish this pedigree nor to flesh out a contemporary understanding of intentionality. It is simply to examine the use of the term “intentionale” or more properly “esse intentionale” in one major medieval author, namely, Thomas Aquinas. The topic is made interesting by the fact that, although modern commentators on Thomas use the term most frequently, Thomas himself used it only twelve times in a corpus of some eight and a half million words. 3 Yet the term is neither unknown nor insignificant to him. As we shall see, it enters his vocabulary at crucial moments.

This paper will first discuss the general lines of Thomas’s theory of knowledge and then examine the occurrence of the term in more detail.

General Lines of Thomas’s Theory of Knowledge.

Thomas espoused and developed an Aristotelian account of knowledge. Briefly and in simple terms, to know is to possess the form of what is known. Presupposed by this position is, of course, the view that material beings are composed of matter and of form and a whole ontology of form. It is form that constitutes the nature of a thing in contrast to matter, which brings it particularity. Form is the principle of being, so that nothing comes into being unless the relevant form is imparted to it. On many levels form is the principle of act. Thomas’s favourite example is that water does not become hot until the form of heat is received by it. Finally, form is the principle of intelligibility.

Thomas develops each of these lines of analysis in great detail, but to follow him would lead us too far afield for the purposes of this paper. Perhaps an example will be the quickest way in which to get a general understanding of his theory.

Consider a tree that stands in a paddock. It has a substantial form, which constitutes it as a tree, and it also has many and varied accidental forms. Peter, let us say, comes upon this tree. His external senses are receptive to various of its accidental forms. He sees colour, shape and movement. He hears the sound of leaves rustling. He may feel the hardness of the bark and so on. In each case an accidental form that properly belongs to the tree is received by Peter. Upon further cognitive activity the individual tree as a whole is perceived and images are formed and retained in imagination and memory. Intellectual knowledge, for Thomas, involves a process of abstraction in which the very nature or essence of “tree” is grasped so that Peter will be able to understand the nature of any tree whatever, no matter what kind it is or where it grows.

We have described a process in which forms that properly belong to the tree are transmitted and are received by Peter. Upon further cognitive activity the individual tree as a whole is perceived and images are formed and retained in imagination and memory. Intellectual knowledge, for Thomas, involves a process of abstraction in which the very nature or essence of “tree” is grasped so that Peter will be able to understand the nature of any tree whatever, no matter what kind it is or where it grows.

3Thomas’s preferred terms are esse immateriale, esse spiritual, and even esse intelligibile. This is, in fact, recognized in recent literature, for instance, by Lawrence Dewan, “St. Thomas and the Integration of Knowledge into Being”; International Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1984): 383-393. He notes (p. 1) that “the Index Thomisticus offers only a handful of references to this expression.” However, he makes no analysis of the actual usage of the term.
identity formed between Peter and the tree. Peter, he says, in some sense becomes the tree. He is constituted as a knower by the same form that constitutes the tree in its being. Alternatively, Peter’s act of knowledge is both specified and actualized by a form which is the tree’s.

Thomas’s solution is to distinguish two kinds of reception of form, and this distinction is the focus of this paper. He says that a form can be received either materially or immaterially. If it is received materially, it is received into matter and the form of green, for instance, makes that matter actually green. The form is said to exercise material being (esse materiale). If it is received immaterially, it is received into a cognitive power, but in this case the form of green does not make the power green. Rather it brings it into the act of knowing green. This form is said to exercise immaterial being (esse immateriale). It is worth noting that strictly speaking there is good reason to call this form a “species” as a technical term since Thomas generally uses species rather than forma for sensible and intelligible forms. Also he frequently uses the terms “spiritual” and “natural” synonymously with the terms “immaterial” and “material” respectively.

Thomas develops this distinction in In II De anima cap. 24 [7] where he is discussing Aristotle’s example of the wax seal (De anima II, 12) and where we also find him using the term esse intentionale. A knower receives form differently, is disposed to form differently, and is assimilated to the source of a form differently from the way in which a natural or physical agent is. In other texts Thomas calls cognitive action an operatio, which is a perfection of the agent, rather than an actio, which takes place outside the agent. But what are the implications of this form of being? Thomas seems to remain content with what he usually says. In seeing a tree, the eye does not become green. Nor, using Aristotle’s oft-quoted example, is a stone that is seen in the eye, rather its form is.

Before moving on we ought note that this text is important historically. Because of its position in the commentary on Aristotle, it has been a standard text for the interpretation of Thomas on immateriality in knowledge. The fact that here Thomas used the term “intentionale” probably prompted its ready acceptance by his followers.

**Thomas’s Use of intentionale**

**Usage in General**

As previously stated, the term, intentionale, which is a neuter adjective, occurs only twelve times in Thomas’s corpus—eleven times as esse intentionale and once as ens intentionale. These twelve occurrences are found in nine separate passages. The adjective, intentionalis, is used only three times apart from these twelve. On the other hand, the noun, intentio, and the verb, intendeo, are used in their various forms with great frequency. The adverbial form, intentionaliter, is never used by Thomas, nor is the abstract noun, intentionalitas.

In five of its occurrences, esse intentionale occurs in the form, habet esse intentionale. Four times it occurs as secundum esse intentionale, which is an adverbial form equivalent to intentionaliter. Once the two forms are combined. In its earliest use the term is used substantively in its own right. It occurs twice this way in the one text.

The apparatus of the Leonine Edition of Thomas’s commentary on the De anima attempts to find

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4 There is also a correlation between species and the Greek eidos and forma and the Greek morphe.
6 Full texts and translations are provided in the appendix. They are referred to in this way in the text.
8 The texts and the dates of their composition are as follows: In IV Sent. d. 44, q. 2, a. 1, qc. 3 obj/ad 2 (twice) (1252-56); De ver. 22, 3 ad 4 (1256-59); ST I 56, 2 ad 3 (twice) (1265-68); ST I 67, 3 (1265-68); De spir. creat. 1 ad 11 (ens) (1267-68); In II De anima cap. 14 (twice) (1267-68); In II De anima cap. 24 (1267-68); In De sensu cap. 4 (1268-69); In De sensu cap. 18 (1268-69). See Roberto Busa, Index Thomisticus. Sect. II, Concordantia Prima, Vol. 12 (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1979-80), 255-256.

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sources for *esse intentionale*.\(^{10}\) *Intentio* (the noun) is found in the Latin Averroes. Thomas used it as early as the *Sentences* and equated it with intelligible form or species often in the sense of “a mere intention”. He used it for the most part in contexts dependent on Avicenna or Averroes.\(^{11}\) An anonymous commentary on *II-III De anima*, possibly written in Paris about 1246/47, says that the sensible when it is in a sense is an *intentio* and again that it has *esse spirituale*.\(^{12}\) Albert the Great did not use *esse intentionale* in his *Summa de homine* of ca. 1245 but rather used *esse spirituale*. However, in his *De anima* (ca. 1254-1257), he did use *esse intentionale* frequently. The editor suggests that the term found its way into the Faculty of Arts in Paris around 1250.

The contexts in which Thomas uses the term are interesting. Four occurrences in three texts [4, 6, 8] deal with the nature of light and with the being of colours in the medium between an eye and its object. Three occurrences in two texts [3, 5] deal with a distinction between the kinds of being enjoyed by angelic intellects themselves and the being enjoyed by the species they contain. Two occurrences [7, 9] deal with human sensitive or intellective knowledge. These nine occurrences are all found in works written after 1265. In addition, the term occurs twice in the *Commentary on the Sentences* in an objection and its reply [1] in the context of the possibility of resurrected bodies. It occurs once in the *De veritate* [2] in a discussion about appetite. We will not study these last two texts; their interest to us lies mainly in the fact that they show that Thomas knew the term as early as 1256 although he did not turn to it in any significant way till after 1265.\(^{13}\)

**The Nature of Light and the Being of Colour in a Medium.**

The question of the nature of light was, in the Middle Ages, considered to be most perplexing, as it remains even today, although for different reasons. What kind of a being is it? It is not a body, yet nor is it a spirit. The point at issue with respect to the being of colour in a medium was that in vision information or the form of colour has to be transmitted between an object and the eye, which is the organ of sight. Rejecting action at a distance, Aristotelian thinkers recognized that the form of colour had to have some presence in the medium between the object and the organ. Again, what kind of being does colour have in this medium?

In *ST* I 67, 3 [4] Thomas asks whether light is a quality or not. In replying he entertains the contrary view that light in air has only intentional being and not natural being and provides two arguments against this position. The first is that light does have an effect on air by making it actually luminous. This he contrasts with the transmission of colours, which has no natural effect on the air. The second argument makes the point that is of interest to us even clearer. “Intentions”, says Thomas, “do not cause natural change” whereas the sun clearly heats bodies on which it shines.

The text from *In II De anima* cap. 14 [6] is taken from what amounts to a separate treatise on the nature of light that Thomas inserted into Chapter Fourteen of his commentary on Book Two of Aristotle’s *De anima*. In that treatise he rejects five views of the nature of light. Light is not a body, nor of a spiritual nature, nor a manifestation of colour, nor the substantial form of the sun, nor something which flows from the sun and has intentional being. The argument against light having intentional being is again that it causes natural changes.

The point of these two discussions is that in them we see Thomas pushed beyond what he usually troubles to say. Normally he is content to say that the immaterial or intentional reception of a form primarily implies that the recipient does not take on the nature of the said form. For instance, in knowing heat, one does not become hot. But here he takes it further. Not only does the recipient not take on the said nature, but also it is unable to act naturally in virtue of a form that it possesses intentionally. Thinking about heat will not boil water (the billy).

In *In De sensu* cap. 4 [8] Thomas uses *esse intentionale* in reference to the being of colours in the medium. The context is a discussion of the need of light for vision and the role of the medium in vision. What is important for our purposes is that here Thomas clearly imputes to intentionale a sense of incompleteness or imperfection.

With this we can return to Aristotle’s example of the seal and wax. The point of the analogy, which has often been lost in the commentary tradition, is not only that the form of the seal is received without its matter, nor only that the wax does not become metallic, but that even the form that is

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\(^{10}\) *In II De anima* p. 128, notes to ll. 292-293; p. 169, notes to l. 56.

\(^{11}\) See also Bonaventure, *In II Sent.* d. 13, a. 3, q. 2 (ed. Quaracchi t. II, p. 329a): “Et hoc modo dicit Commentator super II De anima quod lux est habitus diaphani et quod est in ipso sicut intentio vel species vel simulitudo.” Quoted ibid. p. 128.

\(^{12}\) Ibid. p. 169.

\(^{13}\) In the text from the *Sentences* the term is raised in the objection and repeated by Thomas in the reply. We do not know from whom the objection came. The context of the second text is less interesting for our purposes.
received is weak and not capable of acting in the manner in which it did in the original metal seal. Wax cannot impress wax. Intentional being is a weak form of being, sufficient to found the relation of knowledge, but insufficient to cause further physical change.\footnote{Thomas even goes so far as to say that intentional forms do not have true being. See In I Sent, d. 8, q. 5, a. 2 ad 4 (Mandonnet pp. 228, 230-31) where he distinguishes normal accident that have esse firmum in natura and intentions that non habent esse vere.}

The Problem of Angelic Knowledge of Other Angels.

Thomas insisted against the Augustinian tradition that there is no matter in an angelic nature. He was able to do this because his distinction between essence and existence ensured that even without matter there was potentiality in the angelic natures, so that they were not purely actual as only God could be. Angels, then, are pure forms.

One of the implications of this view is that every angel belongs to a separate species; there is no individuation within a species since, according to Thomas and other Aristotelians, matter is the principle of individuation. The more important implication for our purposes has to do with angels knowing one another. If knowledge comes about through the reception of immaterial form, and if angels are already immaterial forms, what happens when one angel knows another? In various discussions by Thomas, it seems almost as if the angels might coalesce and redivide as they alternatively think about one another and are distracted, or that one could swallow up another simply by thinking about it.

This precise difficulty was raised by the eleventh objector in the first article of Thomas’s Disputed Question on Spiritual Creatures. Thomas replied [5] as follows.

The intelligible form, which is in the intellect of an angel that understands, differs from the angel understood not according to “what is abstracted from matter” and “what is concrete of matter”, but as an intentional being from a being which has been fixed in nature.\footnote{See text 5 and translation.}

Further, he identifies the distinction with the difference between colour in a wall and colour in the eye.

A similar discussion occurs in ST I 56, 2 ad 3 [3]. The issue is whether one angel can know another, and the objection is that the intelligible form of an angel would not differ from the angel itself. Here Thomas’s reply is even clearer. An angel and the intelligible form which corresponds to it differ not according to material being and immaterial being but according to natural being and intentional being. This time Thomas identifies the distinction with that between colour in a wall and colour in the conveying medium, an even weaker form of being.

In the context of the whole of Thomas’s writings, these discussions are extraordinary and, I believe, constitute a real development in his thought. For the most part he is content to write of the abstraction of form from matter and from material conditions as a sufficient condition for knowledge to take place. Such sensible or intelligible forms are said to exercise immaterial being. In one sense, given the materiality of human nature and the world in which we live, this is fair enough. But the risk it runs is that of populating the universe with these immaterial forms that seem to have a stronger form of being than one would really be comfortable with. This seems to be what happened among the later Scholastics, and it drew strong criticism from early modern philosophers such as Hobbes and Descartes, who nevertheless took up the similar notion of ideas.

What these texts show is that, when pushed, Thomas’s position was far subtler than is often recognized. Intentional being is not merely immaterial. It belongs to a different order of being, one so weak that it almost defies speech. It seems to me that Scholasticism has wasted a great deal of time discussing forms or species when it should have been discussing the nature of the act that knowledge is and the kind of relation that is involved in knowing. Thomas says much that is of value about each of these. But that is matter for another paper.

Conclusion.

My conclusion consists of three points.

First. Despite Thomas’s minimal use of the term esse intentionale, it is to be preferred to either esse immateriale or esse spirituale. I would further argue that sensible or intelligible forms ought to be called “intentional species”.

Second. Esse intentionale is a very weak form of being. It is so weak, in fact, that in the text that we have not had time to consider [9] Thomas is prepared to say that forms with intentional being do not admit of contraries. For Thomas, knowledge is an act and is directed towards an object. A form must be present both to constitute that act and to carry the relationship. But this form has a kind of being that belongs only to the act and to the relationship. It does not constitute a new object anymore than Aristotle’s wax seal can be thought to be another metal seal that is capable of imprinting another piece of wax. However, like the
wax seal it carries what is most formal in the metal seal.

Third. Scholasticism has justly been criticised for multiplying forms or species. This criticism can be avoided only by extreme sensitivity to the full implications of the formality of form. This I believe is most difficult to maintain and pushes language to its limits.

The Texts

(Literal translations in chronological order.)

1: In IV Sententia d. 44, q. 2, a. 1, qc. 3 obj. 2 et ad 2. (twice). (1252-56)

Praeterea, immutatio naturalis praecedet immutationem animalem, sicut esse naturale praecedet esse intentionale, sed corpora gloriosa ratione impassibilitatis non immutabuntur immutatione naturali, ergo nec immutacione animali, quae requiritur ad sentiendum. Ad secundum dicendum, quod omne passivum recipit actionem agentis secundum suum modum, si ergo aliquid sit quod natum sit immutari ab activo, naturali et spirituali immutatione, immutatio naturalis praecedet immutationem spiritualem, sicut esse naturale praecedet esse intentionale, si autem natum sit immutari tantum spiritualiter, non oportet quod immutetur naturaliter; sicut est de aere, qui non est receptivus coloris secundum esse naturale, sed solum secundum esse spirituale; et ideo hoc solum modo immutatur; sicut e converso corpora inanimata immutantur per qualitates sensibiles solum naturaliter, et non spiritualiter, in corporebus autem gloriosis non poterit esse aliqua immutatio naturalis; et ideo ibi erit spiritualis immutatio tantum. (In IV Sent. d. 44, q. 2, a. 1, qc. 3 obj. 2 et ad 2. Busa pp. 639, 641.)

Objection. Besides, natural change precedes animate change, just as natural being precedes intentional being. But, by reason of impassibility, glorious bodies will not be changed by natural change, nor, therefore, by animate change, which is required for sensing. Reply. To the second it must be said that every passive thing receives the action of an agent according to its own manner. If, therefore, there should be something which is designed by nature to be changed by an active principle by natural and spiritual change, the natural change precedes the spiritual change, just as natural being precedes intentional being. But if it should be designed by nature to be changed only spiritually, it is not necessary that it be changed naturally, as is the case with air, which is not receptive of colours according to natural being, but only according to spiritual being, and so is changed only in this way. Conversely, inanimate bodies are changed only naturally by means of sensible qualities, and not spiritually. But in glorious bodies there will not be able to be any natural change, and so there will be only spiritual change.

2: De veritate 22, 3 ad 4. (1256-59)

Ad quartum dicendum quod appetens bonum non quaerit habere bonum secundum esse intentionale qualiter habetur a cognoscente, sed secundum esse naturale; et ideo per hoc quod animal habet bonum ut cognoscens ipsum, non exclaudit quin possit eum appetere. (De ver. 22, 3 ad 4. Leomina p. 619.)

To the fourth it must be said that one desiring a good does not seek to have the good according to intentional being in the way it is had by a knower, but according to natural being; and for that reason, from the fact that an animal possesses a good as knowing it, it is not prevented from seeking it.

3: Summa theologiae I 56, 2 ad 3. (twice). (1265-1268)

Ad tertium dicendum quod unus angelus cognoscit alium per speciem eius in intellectu suo existentem, quae differt ab angelo cuius similitudo est, non secundum esse materiale et immateriale, sed secundum esse intentionale. Nam ipse angelus est forma subsistens in esse naturali: non autem species eius quae est in intellectu alterius angelii, sed habet ibi esse intelligibile tantum. Sicut etiam et forma coloris in pariete habet esse naturale, in medio autem deferente habet esse intentionale tantum. (ST I 56, 2 ad 3. B. A. C. I, p. 408.)

To the third it must be said that one angel knows another through [the other angel’s] species existing in its own intellect, which species differs from the angel whose likeness it is, not according to material and immaterial being, but according to natural and intentional being. For the angel itself is a form subsisting in natural being. Not so its species which is in the intellect of another angel; there it has only intelligible being. Likewise just as the form of colour in a wall has natural being, in the conveying medium it has only intentional being.

4: Summa theologiae I 67, 3. (1265-68)

I reply that some have said that light in the air does not have natural being, as does colour in a wall, but intentional being like the likeness of colour in air. But this cannot be for two reasons. First because light designates air, for air becomes luminous in act. But colour does not designate itself, for air is not said to be coloured. Second, because light has an effect in nature, because bodies are heated by means of the rays of the sun. Intentions, however, do not cause natural changes.

5: *De spiritualibus creaturis* 1 ad 11. (ens) (1267-1269)

Ad undecimum dicendum quod species intelligibilis quae est in intellectu angeli intelligentis, differt ab angelo intellecto non secundum abstractum a materia et materiae concretum, sed sicut *ens intentionale* ab ente quod habet esse ratum in natura; sicut differt species coloris in oculo a colore qui est in pariete. (*De spir. creat.* a. 1 ad 11. Marietti p. 372.)

To the eleventh it must be said that the intelligible species, which is in the intellect of an angel that understands, differs from the angel understood not according to "what is abstracted from matter" and "what is concrete of matter", but as an intentional being from a being which has being fixed in nature, as the species of colour in an eye differs from the colour which is in a wall.


Alii uero dixerunt quod lux est forma substantialis solis, et lumen defluens a luce habet *esse intentionale*, sicut species colorum in aere. Vtrumque autem horum est falsum: primum quidem, quia nulla forma substantialis est per se sensibilis, set solo intellectu comprehensibilis (et si dicatur quod id quod uidetur in sole non est lux set splendor, non erit contendendum de nomine, dummodo hoc quod dicimus lucem, scilicet quod visu apprehenditur, non sit forma substantialis); secundum etiam falsum est, quia que habent solum *esse intentionale* non faciunt transmutationem naturalem, radii autem corporum celestium transmutant totam naturam inferiorem. Vnde dicimus quod, sicut corpora elementia habent qualitates actuas per quas agunt, ita lux est qualitas actua corporis celestis per quam agit, et est tercia specie qualitatis sicut et calor. (*In II De anima* cap. 14 (De natura luminis). Leon. pp. 128-129.)

But others have said that light is the substantial form of the sun, and that brightness flowing from light has intentional being just as the species of colours in the air. But each of these is false: the first because no substantial form is per se sensible but is comprehensible by the intellect alone. (And if it be said that that which is seen in the sun is not light but splendour, there will be no need to quarrel over the name, provided that this which we call light, namely what is apprehended by vision, be not a substantial form.) The second is also false because things which have only intentional being do not cause a natural change. The rays of celestial bodies, however, change the whole of inferior nature.

Whence we say that, just as elementary bodies have active qualities through which they act, so light is an active quality of a celestial body through which it acts, and it is in the third species of quality just as even heat.

7: *In II De anima* cap. 24. (1267-68)

Quandoque uero forma recipitur in paciente secundum alium modum essendi quam sit in agente, quia dispositio materialis pacientis ad recipiendum non est similis dispositioni materiali que erat in agente, et ideo forma recipitur in paciente sine materia in quantum paciens assimilatur agenti secundum formam et non secundum materiam; et per hunc modum sensus recipit formam sine materia, quia alterius modi esse habet forma in sensu et in re sensibili: nam in re sensibili habet esse naturale, in sensu autem habet *esse intentionale siue spiritua*; et ponit conueniens exemplum de sigillo et cera, non enim eadem est dispositio cere ad ymaginem, quae erat in ferro et auro. (*In II De anima* cap. 24. *Dubitatio*. Leon. pp. 169.)

But sometimes form is received in a patient according to a mode of being other than it may be in the agent because the material disposition of the patient for receiving is not like the material disposition that was in the agent. Therefore the form is received in the patient without matter in so far as the patient is assimilated to the agent according to form and not according to matter. And in this manner, sense receives form without matter because form has a different mode of being in the sense and in the sensible thing. For in the sensible thing it has natural being, but in the sense it has intentional or spiritual being. And [Aristotle] puts forward a fitting example of the seal and wax (*De anima* II,12), for the disposition of wax to an image is not the same as it was in iron or gold.

8: *In De sensu* cap. 4. (1268-69)

. . . actus enim sunt in susceptius secundum modum ipsorum, et ideo color est quidem in corpore colorato sicut qualitas completa in suo esse naturali, in medio autem est incomplete secundum quoddam *esse intentionale*. (*In De sensu* cap. 4 (438b2-7). Leon. p. 28.)

For acts are in receptive bodies according to their own mode, and so colour is in a coloured body as a perfect quality in its natural being. In the medium,
however, it exists imperfectly according to a certain intentional being.

9: *In De sensu* cap. 18. (1268-69)

Corpus enim naturale recipit formas secundum esse naturale et materiale, secundum quod habent contrarietatem, et ideo non potest idem corpus simul recipere albedinim et nigredinem; set sensus et intellectus recipiunt formas rerum spiritualiter et inmaterialiter secundum esse quodam intentionale, prout non habent contrarietatem, unde sensus et intellectus simul potest recipere species sensibilium contrariorum. (*In De sensu* cap. 18 (dubia 1). Leon. p. 99.)

For a natural body receives forms according to natural and material being in as far as they have contrariety. And therefore the same body is not able to receive white and black at the same time. But sense and intellect receive the forms of things spiritually and immaterially according to a certain intentional being, in so far as they do not have contrariety. Whence sense and intellect can receive the species of sensible contraries at the same time.

Summary List

1: *In IV Sententia* d. 44, q. 2, a. 1, qc. 3 obj. 2 et ad 2. (1252 – 1256)
2: *De veritate* 22, 3 ad 4. (1256 – 1259)
3: *Summa theologiae* I 56, 2 ad 3. (1265 – 1268)
4: *Summa theologiae* I 67, 3. (1265 – 1268)
5: *De spiritualibus creaturis* I 1 ad 11. (1267 – 1269)
7: *In II De anima* cap. 24. (1267 – 1268)
8: *In De sensu* cap. 4. (1268 – 1269)
9: *In De sensu* cap. 18. (1268 – 1269)